反蝗漫畫(轉載)

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[極醜惡]六四天安門事件

1989年6月3日至4日﹐也就是16年前在中華人民共和國首都北京天安門發生了政府命令軍隊大規模屠殺和平示威者及和平居民的嚴重流血慘案﹐致使數以千計的民眾喪生、數以萬計的民眾致傷、致殘。



天安門事件，是大陸在經濟開放、政治相對封閉下爆發的民運。在神聖的民主包裝的背後，天安門事件，實質蘊含著鄧小平與趙紫陽的權力鬥爭。http://www.ck.tp.edu.tw/~ck910954/6415.htm↑◎卜正



十六年前的今天，中國大學生為了爭取民主，遭到解放軍血腥鎮壓，震驚全球，北京當局也因此，引發國際社會嚴厲譴責，現在就讓我們回顧這起事件的始末。

一九八九年，主張改革的中共總書記胡耀邦，心臟病去世，北京的大學生為了悼念他，在天安門廣場示威抗議，為六四事件揭開了序幕。

示威學生在四月底發表公開聲明，爭取民主和自由，並要求與政府直接對話。

五月中，兩、三千名學生在廣場上展開七天絕食，中國政府迫不得已與學生對話，但談判破裂。

接下來兩星期，示威群眾由十萬人增加到五十萬人，近三十個城市也紛紛響應，北京當局於是宣佈戒嚴，封鎖通訊網，並警告學生退出廣場，否則就武力掃蕩。

六月三號，解放軍兵分三路，朝天安門廣場推進，但遭民眾攔截，被迫撤退。

六月四號，數萬名解放軍再度進攻，靠著坦克和裝甲車開道，對毫無武裝的群眾開槍掃射，刺刀殺戮，天安門廣場頓時成為人間煉獄，歷經七小時，解放軍控制了天安門廣場。

六月五號，解放軍繼續鎮壓抗議群眾，手無寸鐵的北京青年王維林、隻身阻擋坦克的畫面，震撼世人。

這次大屠殺至少造成三千人死亡，數萬人受傷。

六月十號，北京當局下令通緝民運領袖，民運人士紛紛逃到海外避難。

中國這次血腥鎮壓，引起全球強烈譴責，西方各國終止和中國的經貿合作和高層往來，導致中國對外關係陷入低潮，直到幾年後才逐漸恢復正常。

北京當局至今仍辯稱，六四鎮壓是為了維持安定，具有正當性，並刻意壓制國內外媒體的相關報導。

但是血染的歷史，永遠不會被人們遺忘。

http://tw.news.yahoo.com/050604/44/1wrap.html↑（民視新聞，綜合報導）

The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition

BY GORDON G. CHANG | DECEMBER 29, 2011

In the middle of 2001, I predicted in my book, The Coming Collapse of China, that the Communist Party would fall from power in a decade, in large measure because of the changes that accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) would cause. A decade has passed; the Communist Party is still in power. But don't think I'm taking my prediction back.
Why has China as we know it survived? First and foremost, the Chinese central government has managed to avoid adhering to many of its obligations made when it joined the WTO in 2001 to open its economy and play by the rules, and the international community maintained a generally tolerant attitude toward this noncompliant behavior. As a result, Beijing has been able to protect much of its home market from foreign competitors while ramping up exports.
By any measure, China has been phenomenally successful in developing its economy after WTO accession -- returning to the almost double-digit growth it had enjoyed before the near-recession suffered at the end of the 1990s. Many analysts assume this growth streak can continue indefinitely. For instance, Justin Yifu Lin, the World Bank's chief economist, believes the country can grow for at least two more decades at 8 percent, and the International Monetary Fund predicts China's economy will surpass America's in size by 2016.
Don't believe any of this. China outperformed other countries because it was in a three-decade upward supercycle, principally for three reasons. First, there were Deng Xiaoping's transformational "reform and opening up" policies, first implemented in the late 1970s. Second, Deng's era of change coincided with the end of the Cold War, which brought about the elimination of political barriers to international commerce. Third, all of this took place while China was benefiting from its "demographic dividend," an extraordinary bulge in the workforce.
Yet China's "sweet spot" is over because, in recent years, the conditions that created it either disappeared or will soon. First, the Communist Party has turned its back on Deng's progressive policies. Hu Jintao, the current leader, is presiding over an era marked by, on balance, the reversal of reform. There has been, especially since 2008, a partial renationalization of the economy and a marked narrowing of opportunities for foreign business. For example, Beijing blocked acquisitions by foreigners, erected new barriers like the "indigenous innovation" rules, and harassed market-leading companies like Google. Strengthening "national champion" state enterprises at the expense of others, Hu has abandoned the economic paradigm that made his country successful.
Second, the global boom of the last two decades ended in 2008 when markets around the world crashed. The tumultuous events of that year brought to a close an unusually benign period during which countries attempted to integrate China into the international system and therefore tolerated its mercantilist policies. Now, however, every nation wants to export more and, in an era of protectionism or of managed trade, China will not be able to export its way to prosperity like it did during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. China is more dependent on international commerce than almost any other nation, so trade friction -- or even declining global demand -- will hurt it more than others. The country, for instance, could be the biggest victim of the eurozone crisis.
Third, China, which during its reform era had one of the best demographic profiles of any nation, will soon have one of the worst. The Chinese workforce will level off in about 2013, perhaps 2014, according to both Chinese and foreign demographers, but the effect is already being felt as wages rise, a trend that will eventually make the country's factories uncompetitive. China, strangely enough, is running out of people to move to cities, work in factories, and power its economy. Demography may not be destiny, but it will now create high barriers for growth.
At the same time that China's economy no longer benefits from these three favorable conditions, it must recover from the dislocations -- asset bubbles and inflation -- caused by Beijing's excessive pump priming in 2008 and 2009, the biggest economic stimulus program in world history (including $1 trillion-plus in 2009 alone). Since late September, economic indicators -- electricity consumption, industrial orders, export growth, car sales, property prices, you name it -- are pointing toward either a flatlining or contracting economy. Money started to leave the country in October, and Beijing's foreign reserves have been shrinking since September.
As a result, we will witness either a crash or, more probably, a Japanese-style multi-decade decline. Either way, economic troubles are occurring just as Chinese society is becoming extremely restless. It is not only that protests have spiked upwards -- there were 280,000 "mass incidents" last year according to one count -- but that they are also increasingly violent as the recent wave of uprisings, insurrections, rampages and bombings suggest. The Communist Party, unable to mediate social discontent, has chosen to step-up repression to levels not seen in two decades. The authorities have, for instance, blanketed the country's cities and villages with police and armed troops and stepped up monitoring of virtually all forms of communication and the media. It's no wonder that, in online surveys, "control" and "restrict" were voted the country's most popular words for 2011.  

That tough approach has kept the regime secure up to now, but the stability it creates can only be short-term in China's increasingly modernized society, where most people appear to believe a one-party state is no longer appropriate. The regime has clearly lost the battle of ideas.

Today, social change in China is accelerating. The problem for the country's ruling party is that, although Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions, their acts of social disruption can have revolutionary implications because they are occurring at an extraordinarily sensitive time. In short, China is much too dynamic and volatile for the Communist Party's leaders to hang on. In some location next year, whether a small village or great city, an incident will get out of control and spread fast. Because people across the country share the same thoughts, we should not be surprised they will act in the same way. We have already seen the Chinese people act in unison: In June 1989, well before the advent of social media, there were protests in roughly 370 cities across China, without national ringleaders.

This phenomenon, which has swept North Africa and the Middle East this year, tells us that the nature of political change around the world is itself changing, destabilizing even the most secure-looking authoritarian governments. China is by no means immune to this wave of popular uprising, as Beijing's overreaction to the so-called "Jasmine" protests this spring indicates. The Communist Party, once the beneficiary of global trends, is now the victim of them.
So will China collapse? Weak governments can remain in place a long time. Political scientists, who like to bring order to the inexplicable, say that a host of factors are required for regime collapse and that China is missing the two most important of them: a divided government and a strong opposition.
At a time when crucial challenges mount, the Communist Party is beginning a multi-year political transition and therefore ill-prepared for the problems it faces. There are already visible splits among Party elites, and the leadership's sluggish response in recent months -- in marked contrast to its lightning-fast reaction in 2008 to economic troubles abroad -- indicates that the decision-making process in Beijing is deteriorating. So check the box on divided government.
And as for the existence of an opposition, the Soviet Union fell without much of one. In our substantially more volatile age, the Chinese government could dissolve like the autocracies in Tunisia and Egypt. As evident in this month's "open revolt" in the village of Wukan in Guangdong province, people can organize themselves quickly -- as they have so many times since the end of the 1980s. In any event, a well-oiled machine is no longer needed to bring down a regime in this age of leaderless revolution.
Not long ago, everything was going well for the mandarins in Beijing. Now, nothing is. So, yes, my prediction was wrong. Instead of 2011, the mighty Communist Party of China will fall in 2012. Bet on it.

[極醜惡]六四事件中歷史的空白 - 解放軍在凌晨4時至清晨7時清場的真實紀錄

sugikogi 於 2011-05-28 上傳

我Jason今年42歲, 正正是當年六四事件中最被深刻烙印的一代! 由激情到漠視, 由未能忘記及未敢回憶, 到尋求爭議的真相...昨晚, 身為兩個女兒父親的我, 終於要面對! 面對女兒對六四的詢問.

就是支聯會在Times Square擺設民主女神像, 並引起新聞報導, 正值晚飯時, 就讀小二7歲的大女Sugi就直接了當地問"爸爸, 點解要豎立女神像? 咩係六四事件?"

我自問就算當年就是那代學生, 但沒有能力準確無誤地回答, 結果簡單說是政府/軍隊和學生/市民在首都北京發生嚴重武力衝突. 因為學生/市民要求停止腐敗, 但政府/軍隊視為國外力量顛覆政權....結果當時在首都北京死了許多人!

然後飯後和Sugi在youtube看六四的clips, 讓她在成長中慢慢地自己判斷.

結果在youtube上發現了我從未看過的這一段ATV的記實式報導, 裡面是西班牙記者跟著死守學生在六四凌晨4點廣場熄燈後直到清晨後7點的真實情況.

我不是說政府/軍隊無錯,
亦不是說支聯會有錯,
更不是挑釁仍然無法接受事故的香港人和死了家人朋友的大陸同胞,
但歷史是必須經過重複驗證無誤後讓後人作為參考和啟示,
無論大人和學生亦值得看看這些年來被忽視或空白的這一段歷史!
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回應禪一先生(轉載)

by Christina Walter on Tuesday, January 31, 2012 at 7:14pm

本文回應禪一先生於上一篇網誌《香港精神還在沉睡嗎？》的回應。
http://blogcity.me/blog/reply_blog_edit.asp?f=9BQV69GOYE93657&id=367094

禪一先生：

敢問閣下，「五十年不變」的口號，你認為今天實現了嗎？香港也有在變，變得更差了！還是閣下不食人間煙火，自己的世界沒有跟著時代轉變嗎？正正香港被高度資本主義剝削，我們才要尋求改變。

閣下說香港沒有管治人材，我贊同。二戰前香港屬大清帝國，開埠再經歷二戰後屬英國殖民地，主權被移交後成為中共殖民地，所以均沒有不被騎住的統治下培養的實戰經驗；基本法第二章第十二條寫著「高度自治」，請問閣下今天看得出「高度自治」在香港成立嗎？

若 然閣下是一位尊重法律的君子，那麼更加要尊重基本法；既然今天的香港不能實現高度自治，我們更應尋求出路。閣下又說「香港人可以到內地產子」，可是香港人 在內地產子，是不會有內地戶籍的；相反，基本港第三章第二十四條（一），寫著「香港特別行政區永久性居民為在香港特別行政區成立以前或以後在香港出生的中 國公民」，為甚麼是「中國公民」，而不是「全世界」？難道要迫本人搬出陰謀論的殖民政策嗎？這絕不關乎歧視問題。香港地少人多，資源有限，從醫療人手至房 屋政策，都已承受著很大壓力；每個地方都要為人民的福祉為依歸，這是常理，香港政府不是開善堂，香港人民有權選擇向誰施出援手，例如內地山區兒童或非洲的 戰亂地區，但若我們「被迫」向內地提出支援，這等於向納稅人打劫，我們不是為歧視而歧視, 難道你晚上歸家關閘鎖門是歧視賊人？如果連保護自己都被說成歧視傷害自己的人，我真的為香港犬儒既一代感到痛心！

既然香港 的資源有限，為甚麼內地的幸福和權利比香港人更重要？經過幾十年的日子，香港人已成為努力拼搏的獨特城市，但香港人不是聖人，如硬要將香港人擺上道德高 地，例如要引用聖經，「公義」未被彰顯，我們何以以「愛」來對待鄰舍？舊約也有為保衛家園而發動的戰爭紀述吧，為何香港人不可以保衛家園，硬要將我們自保 說成「歧視」？

對於中國十三億人來說，香港七百萬人可說是「小數民族」，你要理解「歧視」一詞，意指強勢一群向弱勢社群作出不公平的對待，既然強國自稱掘起，那何需向香港的有限資源下手？我們沒有歧視內地人，只是被渲染了。

多 番醫療失誤雖不能全歸疚雙非產子問題，但卻有不能推卸的一部份責任。香港人是擁護人權的，但人權並不等於將資源無限開放，這好比你邀請人家來作客，客人在 你家喧賓奪主，你毫不反抗，說這是人權呀，然後客人不單止把你家的食物吃光，還要成為你家主人，你連浴室都沒得站，還得把你每月辛辛苦苦的收入和多年來的 積蓄用光，你還是說這是人權呀！這說得通嗎？

香港人尊重法治精神，所以我們才尋求合法途徑去爭取改變，請不要把我們說成煽動暴動的一群。

再 者，敢問閣下，本人的文章歧視了甚麼人？難道香港居民在內地產子沒有得到該地戶籍，是內地歧視香港嗎？難道香港醫院有救無類，也是歧視了你嗎？難道香港產 婦在公營醫院要睡走廊待產、床位都讓給雙非婦，都是歧視嗎？難道香港由於交通擠塞問題而增加新車稅項、卻讓內地人民自駕遊增加交通負荷，又是歧視嗎？我不 知本文哪一句挑起了閣下「被歧視」的根，本人沒有說不許內地人來港，而是希望香港人都能擔起要求政府正視以民為本的民主價值。

內地文革使內地的中國人都只看錢看而把道德丟在一二邊了，可惜，本人告訴你，「有奶便是娘」不是香港人的本質，總好過某地的人，窮得只剩錢。
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